State of Utah v. Leon Marlowe Kent : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)
1967
State of Utah v. Leon Marlowe Kent : Brief of
Respondent
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Phil L. Hansen and Gary A. Frank; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Kent, No. 10713 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4930
&TATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
LEON MARLOWE KENT,. ·.:-. 
Defendant-ARI P PtF ·- .,,;:..,.-
mu MITSUNAGA 
WaalDefendar 
··~~ .JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
~ •t lut Fourth Sout.la· 
<,1'. '91t i.te City, Utah 
Oi'.•: ..._..,, for DlilleDllllDl-All• 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE------------------------
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ------------------------------




STATEMENT OF FACTS-------···------··---------------·--·----------· 2 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I 
THE ACTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS BY 
THE POLICE OFFICERS DID NOT CONSTI-
TUTE A SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHIN 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE. -·----------------·· 3 
A. NO EVIDENCE AGAINST THE AP-
PELLANT WAS OBTAINED BY MEANS 
OF A TRESPASS OR UNLAWFUL ENTRY. 3 
B. THE 0 B SE RV AT I 0 NS BY THE 
POLICE OFFICERS DID NOT CONSTI-
TUTE A SEARCH. -------------------------------------------- 5 
CONCLUSION 8 
Cases Cited 
Burks v. United States, 287 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1961) ---- 6 
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) ------------ 4 
Chapman v. United States, 346 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1965) 6 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1940) ------------ 4 
Martin v. United States, 155 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1946) 6 
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ------------·--- 4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
People v. Regalado, 36 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1964) ----- ---- ---- --- ----- -------- ---- -. --- . -- -- --- .. -- .. --- .. -- . --- ...... ---- .... . 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 ( 1961) _ ___ G 
Sfate v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P.2d 535 (1964) _ ___ 5 
State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962) Cer. 
den. 374 U.S. 835 (1963) ____________ --------------------- ......... 5 
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) ---------------- _______ 4 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Leon Marlowe Kent, was con-
victed of the crime of unlawful possession of nar-
cotic drugs. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with unlawful pos-
session of narcotic drugs. Prior to trial a motion to 
suppress certain evidence was made on the basis 
of an allegedly illegal search and seizure. The trial 
court denied the motion to suppress. On a trial be-
fore the court sitting without a jury, appellant was 
found guilty of the charge of unlawful possession 
of narcotics. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
.Respondent su
1
bmits that the conviction and the 
dernal of appellant s motion to suppress certain evi-
dence should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following statement of 
facts. The allegedly illegal search and seizure 
occurred as follows: 
In pursuit of an investigation (R. 25), Officer H. 1 
W. Patrick, of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
proceeded to the Tower Motel, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for the purpose of undertaking a surveillance of ths 
activities of the appellant (R. 25). Officer Patrick con· 
tacted the manager of the Tower Motel and asked 
for an adjoining unit so that "We could probably se8 
associates coming and going to their residence" 
(R. 25). The manager informed Officer Patrick thal 
the only feasible adjoining unit was occupied, "Bui 
that she [the manager J had an area that she fell 
would be adequate in providing the purpose tha: ' 
we needed. She took me to an overhead area, which 
is where all the heating and air conditioning ducts, 
all the wires and the access to the boiler room was, 
above the unit area. It encompasses the whole up-
stairs story of the unit or of the motel" (R. 25). From 
this area, the officer had access to an open vent to 
the bathroom of appellant's unit from which it was 
felt that visual and verbal observations could be 
made (R. 26). The vent was of such a nature thal a 
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person standing in the bathroom of the appellant's 
motel unit could look up and see someone looking 
down the vent (R. 27): 
On the third day of observation, Officer Patrick 
observed appellant enter the bathroom and prepare 
to "shoot up" (R. 33). Officer Patrick radioed to his 




THE ACTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS BY THE 
POLICE OFFICERS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
SENSE. 
A. NO EVIDENCE AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
WAS OBTAINED BY MEANS OF A TRESPASS 
OR UNLAWFUL ENTRY. 
The record is unequivocable that Officer Patrick 
approached the manager of the Tower Motel for the 
purpose of obtaining a unit adjacent to appellant's 
unit for the purpose of surveillance. The manager 
informed the officer that there was not an available 
unit but suggested and escorted the officer to an 
area overhead of the appellant's unit (R. 25). Appel-
lant has not nor does he now claim a right or interest 
in the overhead area to which the officer was es-
corted. 
It is submitted that there must be a physical in-
trusion into an area over which one has dominion 
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and control before there is a search of that area by 
another. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 
(1940). In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) 
the United States Supreme Court was asked to con: 
sider a problem allegedly left unanswered in Gold· 
man v. United States, supra. That problem was the 
affect on a search and seizure question of a trespass. 
The court stated at 753: 
Only in the case of physical entry, either by force ... 
by unwilling submission to authority ... or without 
any express or implied consent ... would the problem 
left undecided in the Goldman case be before the 
court. 
The Court then concluded that because there 
had not been a physical entry so as to constitute a 
trespass, the problem would remain unanswered. 
In the instant case, it cannot be said that Officer 
Patrick violated an area over which the appellant 
exercised complete dominion and control. Rather, 
the officer's physical presence was in an area suq-
gested and designated by the manager of the motel 
and over which the manager had exclusive control 
and dominion. Appellants cite Stoner v. California, 
376 U.S. 483 (1964), and Chapman v. United States, 
365 U.S. 610 (1961), for the proposition that the con-
sent of the owner of the motel was without effect 
(R. 8). However, the Stoner case was involved with 
an actual entry by the police officers into the peti-
tioner's motel room and the Chapman case involved 
a physical entry into the petitioner's rented hom;· 
Here, there was no physical entry of appella~t s 
room by the police officer. The area from which 
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Officer Patrick made the assailed observations was 
an ar8a over which the appellant could claim no 
valid right or interest. No citation of authority is 
necessary for the proposition that a land owner or 
another vested with the complete control and domin-
ion over an area may allow persons thereon and 
that such presence is not subject to complaint by 
one with no interest or right in the area. 
Appellant's reference to Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), as being an analogous 
case, is incorrect. In that case, the court was keenly 
aware of the actual physical intrusion effected by 
the police with the result that the petitioners entire 
heating system was converted into a conductor of 
sound. As stated at 509, " ... the eavesdropping was 
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical 
penetration into the premises occupied by the peti-
tioners." 
B. THE OBSERVATIONS BY THE POLICE 
OFFICERS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEARCH. 
From the area occupied by Officer Patrick, ob-
servation into the unit occupied by the appellant 
was readily available (R. 27). The officer did not have 
to take any affirmative action, such as removing a 
cover from the vent (R. 27), but rather, merely ob-
served that which was open to observation by any-
one in the area which the officer occupied. 
This court has recognized the principle that 
mere observation of that which is readily open to 
view does not constitute a search. In State v. Allred. 
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16 Utah 2d 41, 44, 395 P.2d 535, 537 (1964), it was 
stated: 
No. search was n_ecessary for the officer to find these 
articles, they bemg fully disclosed to his view when 
he approached the car. Under such circumstances 
where no search is required the constitutional guaran'. 
tee is not applicable. 
In Chapman v. United States, 346 F.2d 383, 387 
(9th Cir. 1965), it was stated: 
It is not a search for an officer to observe (once law-
fully near or on and within premises) that which is 
clearly and plainly to be seen, even if he uses search 
lights or field glasses. 
An officer of the peace does not have to ignore 
that which his senses reveal. Burks v. United States, 
287 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1961); Martin v. United States, 
155 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1946). Officer Patrick did no 
more than observe that which was open to observa-
tion by anyone occupying the area. It may also here 
be noted that Officer Patrick testified that it would 
be possible for someone in the bathroom of appel-
lant's unit to readily ascertain that he was being ob-
served through the vent (R. 27). 
In State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.Zd 761 (19621, 
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963), the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey considered a challenge that there was 
an illegal search and seizure where police officers 
observed the commission of a crime through a crack 
in the door or the keyhole. The court stated, 37 NJ 
at 495, 181 A.2d at 768: 
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Here the officers saw the offense. That they saw it 
through a crack in the door or the keyhole does not 
affect the direct character of the knowledge gained 
or the conclusion that the offense occurred in their 
'presence' within the meaning of that word. Rather 
it raises at best a different question, whether thus to 
peer into private property through an aperture con-
stitutes a search, with the result that the arrest de-
pended upon the product of the search, rather than 
the search upon the arrest. 
The court concluded, 37 N.J. at 496, 181 A.2d at 
769: 
This leaves the fact that officers looked through an 
opening to view what was going on within the apart-
ment. Peering through a window or a crack in a door 
or a keyhole is not, in the abstract, genteel behavior, 
but the Fourth Amendment does not protect against 
all conduct unworthy of a good neighbor. Even sur-
veillance of a house to see who enters and leaves is 
something less than good manners would permit. But 
it is the duty of a policeman to investigate, and we 
cannot say that in striking a balance between the 
rights of the individual and the needs of law enforce-
ment, the Fourth Amendment itself draws the blinds 
the occupant could have drawn but did not. In the 
absence of a physical entry into premises secured by 
the amendment, there is no unreasonable search. In 
such circumstances it has been held that the guaran-
teed right of privacy is not violated when a police 
officer, by use of his senses, detects a criminal event 
occurring in an area protected by the amendment. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Appellant's brief, page 7, states: 
See also People v. Regalado, 36 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 1964), wherein narcotics seized following an 
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?bservation made by an officer through a small hole 
m a hotel room door were held inadmissible. 
However, appellant's brief fails to clarify the 
fact that the court was primarily concerned with the 
knowledge of the arresting officers in two respects. 
The court stated, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 797: 
The only reason they [the officers] had for believincr 
a crime was being committed what was Walsh sa; 
when he peeked through the hole in the door. 
The officers knew, from their familiarity with the 
methods of the police in the district, that the hole 
was one of many which the police had bored for use 
in spying upon the inmates of rented rooms. The 
holes were maintained for the use of any and all 
officers while on spying missions. 
In the instant case, Officer Patrick testified that 
contact with the manager of the Tower Motel was ' 
effectuated in pursuit of an investigation (R. 25). It is 
also conceded that Officer Patrick took no action 
other than to observe that which was open to view. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the conviction of the appel-
lant and the denial of appellant's motion to suppress 
certain evidence should be affirmed on the ground 
that there was no physical trespass or unlawful 
entry into the premises occupied by the appellant. 
Rather, the officer was merely observing that which 
was open to view from an area suggested and w 
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vealed to the officer by the person having complete 
control and dominion over the area. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Asst. Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
